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Abstract 
This article considers proposals to reform the law in response to recent high profile 
cases concerning the medical treatment of children, currently before Parliament in 
the Access to Palliative Care and Treatment of Children Bill 2019-21. It considers the 
proposed procedural change, to introduce a requirement for mediation before court 
proceedings, and argues that dispute resolution processes should be a matter of 
good practice rather than enshrined in law. It argues that the proposed substantive 
change to determination of best interests would not result in different outcomes 
because the best interests analysis co-exist with the legal and professional duties of 
doctors to children in their care. It argues that if there is to be reform of the law it 
needs to follow from a comprehensive review of all the issues in which the minimum 
standards imposed by law fit together with good practice standards and not in 
response to individual cases.   
 
Introduction 
Sympathy for the parents of children whose life-support has been withdrawn 
following high-profile and highly charged court cases gives some weight to their 
claims that the law and legal processes need to change. The parents of Charlie Gard 
have been the most determined, working together with NHS professionals, ethicists, 
and lawyers to develop Charlie’s Law. Similar proposals for changes to the legal 
processes were made by a supporter of the parents of Alfie Evans.1 Whilst the 
parents of Tafida Raqeeb,2 with whom MacDonald J agreed that it was in her best 
interests for ventilation to be continued, expressed the view that the Children Act 
1989 needed to be revised to give better protection to parental rights. There is 
currently no specific legislation addressing the provision of medical treatment or 
medical decisions with respect to children. The principles governing decisions 
concerning the provision of medical treatment to children have developed through the 
case law within the framework established by the Children Act 1989.3 This article 
considers proposals to reform the law in light of these recent high profile cases in 
order to contribute to the wider debate over reform of the law. It argues that reform of 
the law is not necessary as the common law, within the framework provided by the 
Children Act 1989, has the ability to adapt to the changing social, legal, and cultural 
context. However, if there is to be reform it needs to follow from a comprehensive 
review of all the issues in which the minimum standards imposed by law fit together 
with good practice standards and not in response to individual cases.   
 
The Access to Palliative Care and Treatment of Children Bill 2019-21 (the Bill) 
currently before Parliament was introduced as a private members Bill to the House of 
Lords by Baroness Finlay in January 2020, with specific reference to the case of 
Charlie Gard.4 Progress of the Bill, which was not given government support, was 
disrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic and is yet to reach the committee stage. This 
Bill is the third occasion on which legislation has been proposed which would change 
the law governing medical treatment decisions concerning children, influenced by the 
views of parents in recent high profile cases.   
 
Charlie Gard’s parents, Connie Yates and Chris Gard, have argued for a change to 
the law informed by their experience of the litigation against Great Ormond Street 
Hospital for Sick Children (GOSH) to try to prevent the withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment from their son.5 Charlie’s Law seeks to change processes to prevent cases 
reaching court by access to clinical ethics committees, medical mediation, and 
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providing parents with their child’s medical reports. They want better advice and 
support for families on ethics and rights, independent second opinions, and access to 
legal aid.  Substantively, they want better protection of parental rights. Reflecting the 
argument advanced on their behalf on appeal, they seek to restrict the involvement of 
courts to cases where the child is at risk of significant harm. They have expressed 
the view that the best interests analysis of the current law provides a ‘broad platform 
for the overruling of parent’s wishes’ and that there was insufficient evidence that 
providing nucleoside therapy to Charlie would have caused him significant harm, so 
that this threshold would have prevented the judge from deciding his case and 
enabled them to have taken Charlie to the US for a trial of innovative therapy. 
 
Clause one of the current Bill concerns palliative care services in the NHS and 
dominated debate in the House of Lords. Clause two, concerned with disputes over 
the medical treatment of a child, would enact procedural change – introducing a 
requirement for mediation before court proceedings – and substantive change to 
determination of best interests and the duties of doctors to children in their care. 
These are considered in turn to argue that dispute resolution processes should be a 
matter of good practice rather than enshrined in law and that the proposed 
substantive change would not result in different outcomes because, as with the 
current law, best interests analysis exists alongside the legal and professional duties 
of doctors to children in their care. 
 
Mediation 
The first reform proposal in response to the campaign for Charlie’s Law took the form 
of amendments introduced by Lord Mackay to the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill 
to provide for access to a clinical ethics committee and for medical mediation to be 
made available when a dispute has arisen.6 Lord Mackay explained that this 
provision, aimed at preventing cases reaching court unnecessarily, was a 
‘proportionate and long-overdue measure’ which he hoped would be the first step to 
enactment of Charlie’s Law’.7 However, as an amendment to the Mental Capacity Act 
2005 it would only have applied to patients aged 16. The amendments were not in 
the Act when it was passed in 2019.  
 
The provisions of the current Bill would apply when consideration is being given to an 
application to the High Court under the Children Act 1989 or under the inherent 
jurisdiction of the High Court for an order which has the effect of approving the giving 
or withdrawal of any form of medical treatment for a child. Except in urgent cases, an 
attempt would first have to be made to resolve the differences, between the hospital 
and persons with parental responsibility or interest in the welfare of the child, by 
mediation with an independent mediator. Requiring mediation before a court 
application is made has a precedent in family law in s.10 of the Children and Families 
Act 2014 and Family Procedure Rules 3.5-3.10 which apply to private law disputes 
such as arrangements over where a child is to live or specific issues that have arisen 
with respect to the upbringing of the child, for example, his or her education or 
religious upbringing.8  
 
Use of mediation has been encouraged by judges as a means by which to identify 
common ground. In the high court in Charlie Gard’s case, Francis J expressed the 
view that mediation might resolve the issues in some cases, in others it might lead to 
a better understanding between the parents and clinical team.9 This was duly noted 
by GOSH which undertook to consider mediation in future cases.10 When, following 
further tests, Charlie’s parents agreed that it was no longer in his best interests to 
undergo a trial of the therapy, GOSH offered mediation as a way by which to agree 
with his parents the end of life plan for Charlie.11 The offer was not accepted and the 
end of life care of Charlie provided following declarations made by Francis J. Prior to 
 3 
the court proceedings, there were three unsuccessful attempts at mediation between 
the clinical team at Alder Hey and the parents of Alfie Evans.12  
 
Although it did not avoid the need for a court hearing, mediation meetings held 
between the parents of 9 year-old X and her treating team at GOSH in relation to her 
future treatment in the event of a deterioration in her condition had provided her 
parents with the opportunity to voice their concerns and enabled an exchange of 
information including from independent experts. As a consequence, when the court 
proceedings commenced the issues had narrowed, agreement reached on the 
withholding of a number of invasive procedures, leaving the question whether it was 
in X’s best interests to receive a form of non-invasive ventilation and to be admitted 
to intensive care.13 However, notably, in this case Russell J was critical of the referral 
of X’s case to the clinical ethics committee at GOSH without involvement of her 
parents. Like mediation, referral to a clinical ethics committee might be good practice 
in the attempt to clarify the issues and avoid litigation. However, Russell J observed 
that there is no guidance on the constitution or conduct of Ethics Committees. In the 
view of the judge, it could not be good practice for Ethics Committees to consider 
cases without the participation of, or consultation with, patients or their families to 
ensure that their views are taken into consideration. Failure to involve X’s parents 
had contributed to their anxiety and feelings of alienation and exclusion.14 For 
legislation to mandate a trial of an alternative dispute resolution alone, as the current 
Bill does, does not ensure good practice in its provision.  
 
When communication is breaking down and trust eroding, the commencement of 
legal proceedings can fuel the conflict and entrench polarised positions.15 In contrast, 
mediation has the potential to address the real causes of the dispute and reduce the 
alienation between parents and the treating team.16 Mediation is one of a variety of 
responses available to maintain or nurture trust and communication in difficult cases 
when there are different opinions about a child’s best interests. Guidance issued by 
the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health in response to the recent high 
profile cases directs practitioners to the range of support available to them and to 
parents to prevent and manage conflict including second opinions, clinical ethics 
committees, and mediation.17 This guidance could be further developed to help 
practitioners determine which of the range of support mechanisms may be 
appropriate in an individual case and also the values which should guide them in 
their response to a developing dispute. Mediation offers one method by which 
disagreements might be resolved and should be used as a matter of good practice in 
appropriate cases rather than legally proscribed for all.  
 
Best Interests, Significant Harm and Reasonable Refusal  
The current Bill would require a court to ‘assume, unless the contrary is clearly 
established’ that medical treatment proposals put forward by any person holding 
parental responsibility for the child are in the child’s best interests.  The explanation, 
given in the notes, is that this provision ‘reinforces the socio-medical norm’ that those 
holding parental responsibility are seeking to act in the best interests of the child.18 At 
first sight, the clause as originally drafted seems to go no further than to reflect the 
position adopted in the cases in which it is accepted that the child’s parents are 
genuinely acting according to their heartfelt judgement of their child’s best interests 
as the ones who know the child best. However, the clause goes further to create an 
as- or pre-sumption that the child should be treated as the parents propose, a 
presumption that requires clearly established evidence to the contrary in order to be 
rebutted. Despite the burden of proof this would introduce being unclear and the 
provision being tantamount to a reversion to parental authority, it is unlikely to result 
in different outcomes. This is because by the time the issue is brought before the 
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court, as currently, the Trust will have evidence from the child’s treating team, second 
opinions, and independent experts to rebut the presumption. 
 
Further, an amendment suggested by Baroness Jolly to be added at the Committee 
stage would require the court to ‘consider’ any treatment proposal presented by any 
person holding parental responsibility ‘unless contrary evidence is established that 
the proposed treatment poses a disproportionate risk of significant harm.”19 
Inevitably, judges already ‘consider’ the treatment proposal presented by the holder 
of parental responsibility given that is the issue under dispute. Raising similar burden 
of proof issues the amendment would require the provision of the treatment proposed 
by the parents unless ‘established’ by ‘contrary evidence’ that it presents a 
‘disproportionate risk of significant harm’. The merits or otherwise of a significant 
harm, rather than best interests, threshold has been debated at length in the 
academic literature and are not repeated here.20 Here it is argued that the 
introduction of a significant harm threshold together with clause 2(5), directed at the 
legal duties of doctors to children in their care, would not result in different outcomes.  
 
Clause 2(5) provides that a doctor cannot be required to provide a specific medical 
treatment to a child when there are reasonable grounds to refuse to do so.21 This 
would change the current law that neither parents nor the court can require a doctor 
to treat contrary to their clinical or professional judgement. This clause raises first the 
question of the difference between the current law and the proposed amendment and 
then the question of how this clause would work with the presumption of the parental 
view of best interests and, if introduced, the significant harm threshold.  
 
The current law is frequently stated but rarely applied given that in the majority of 
cases the judiciary have agreed with the conclusion of the treating team on the best 
interests of the child. The principle originated in the judgment of Lord Donaldson MR 
in Re J (1991),22 repeated as part of his ratio in Re J (1993).23  In the later case, Lord 
Donaldson also said that if there were another qualified doctor willing, and with the 
facilities, to treat the child as the parents wanted, the Trust would have to consider its 
current responsibilities to the child and to other children who may need its facilities, 
whilst the parents would have to consider carefully the advice and consider any risks 
involved in a transfer.24 In the recent case of Tafida Raqeeb, MacDonald J stated that 
the consequence of his conclusion that continued ventilation was in her best interests 
was that it had to be continued either within the NHS Trust or by the hospital in Italy 
where the team were, in their professional judgement, prepared to continue 
ventilation.25 In Re MB, Holman J concluded, despite the unanimous medical opinion 
of the treating team and independent experts, that it was in MB’s best interests for 
the current care he was receiving to be continued. Applying the principle that a judge 
could not require doctors to treat contrary to their professional judgement,26 Holman J 
stated his conclusion but that he could not make an order or declaration to that 
effect.27 
 
Given that in the majority of cases judges agree with the conclusion of the treating 
team as to the child’s best interests, the conclusions in Re MB and in relation to 
Tafida Raqeeb being rare in the body of case law, there is a lack of authority as to 
the nature of the principle. Although the judges use the terms interchangeably, 
presumably professional judgement is wider than clinical judgment, the latter reached 
through the application of clinical knowledge and experience, the former embracing 
professional guidance and value ‘judgements about what is of value in life, how best 
to promote the child’s interests, and how different or competing interests should be 
weighed against each other’.28 Furthermore, medical treatment involves numerous 
judgements. Doctors must fulfil the standard of care in the diagnosis, identification of 
treatment options and provision of treatment and make a professional judgement 
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about which of the available treatment options is in the best interests of the child. 
When a parent has a different view about best interests, doctors will have to decide 
whether, in their professional judgement they can accede to the parental wishes. In 
some circumstances, they may reach a professional judgement that they cannot 
treat, or continue to treat as the parent wishes them to do.  
 
It is reasonable for a doctor to refuse to treat a child in a way that is not supported by 
a competent body of professional opinion. For example, in the April hearing of the 
future medical treatment of Charlie Gard, there was not the evidence before the court 
that a trial of nucleoside therapy was supported by a competent body of professional 
opinion.29  
 
For a doctor to refuse to provide a treatment option which is supported by a 
competent body of professional opinion but not in their professional judgement best 
for the child may be unreasonable or may be within the range of reasonable 
responses. In such a case, given there is a competent body of professional opinion 
prepared to treat, provision of treatment is not precluded. The view of the practitioner 
prepared to treat would be considered alongside the risks of transfer, as occurred 
with respect to the care of Tafida Raqeeb.  
 
Where the Trust has referred the matter to court because the treating team can no 
longer treat as the parents wish because to continue to do so is ‘professionally 
wrong’ or ‘so contrary to [the child’s] best interest that it would be inimical to their 
respective Hippocratic oaths to treat her and would therefore be unethical,’30 refusal 
would not seem unreasonable. It is difficult to see that a conscientious doctor, acting 
competently, supported by second opinions, independent experts and acting in 
accordance with professional guidance, would be considered to be acting 
unreasonably in refusing to provide the treatment according to parental wishes as in 
many of recent cases concerned with the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from 
a child.31  
 
Putting the clauses together, doctors can reasonably refuse to provide treatment 
when they disagree with the parent’s view that treatment is in the best interests of the 
child. If there is another practitioner who in the exercise of their professional 
judgement is prepared to treat transfer should be considered but the court cannot 
require the doctor to treat contrary to their professional judgement or reasonable 
refusal. It may be reasonable for a doctor to refuse to treat a child contrary to their 
legal and professional duties to the child even when the risk of significant harm is not 
disproportionate. The nature of the legal, ethical, and professional duties owed by 
doctors to children in their care should be the focus of any review of reform to the 
law.  
 
Conclusions 
Sympathy for parents of seriously ill children who disagree with their child’s doctors 
about their medical treatment is understandable but cannot provide the basis for law 
reform. In 1981, the case of R v Arthur, in which Dr Arthur was prosecuted following 
the death of a newborn baby with Down’s Syndrome for whom he had instructed 
nursing care only, prompted the Limitation of Treatment Bill. It proposed that no 
criminal offence would be committed when a doctor withheld or withdrew treatment 
from a child, to which the child’s parents had given consent, and two doctors certified 
that the child suffered from severe physical or mental ‘handicap’ that was either 
irreversible or of such gravity that after receiving all reasonably available treatment 
the child would enjoy no worthwhile quality of life. In assessing the child’s prospective 
quality of life, doctors would be directed to consider a number of factors including 
anticipated pain and suffering, the child’s potential to communicate and, reflecting the 
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facts in R v Arthur, the willingness of his or her parents to care for the child. The Bill, 
which did not pass into law, reflected the concerns of the time, the potential criminal 
liability of doctors, that children with disabilities may not have a worthwhile quality of 
life and that the care of disabled children, given attitudes to disability and lack of 
support, was burdensome.   
 
Legislation which no longer reflects current values can be reformed, although as we 
have seen with the Abortion Act 1967 and in relation to assisted dying, governments 
avoid grappling with controversial matters of life and death. Legislation on medical 
issues requires broad frameworks such as those provided by the Children Act 1989 
and Mental Capacity Act 2005 which, like the common law, are able to adapt to the 
changing social, legal, and cultural context. Whether the law and legal processes 
governing the provision of medical treatment to children is best left to the common 
law or needs a specific legislative framework needs to be decided following a 
comprehensive review of all the issues informed by a broad range of experiences. 
Consideration needs to be given to the relationship between the minimum standards 
imposed by the law and good practice guidance and to the legal and professional 
duties of doctors as well as the best interests standard.  Legislation which so 
profoundly affects the lives of children, their parents and families, and health 
professionals should not be framed in reaction to an individual case however 
sympathetic we are to the plight of the devoted parents of a seriously ill child. 
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